Mohit Goel*
The global shipbuilding industry has shifted its focus toward low-cost manufacturing bases over the past century, driven by competitive labour and production expenses. Emerging nations have benefited from this shift, especially during periods of high demand. The distribution of shipbuilding orders has shown distinct trends across different regions. While South Korea and European countries have seen their order-books dominated by high-value, technologically-advanced vessels, such as container ships and luxury cruise liners, reflecting their expertise in complex shipbuilding, China has focused more heavily on producing bulk carriers, which cater to the demand for cost-effective cargo transportation and align with its mass-production capabilities. These distinctions highlight the strategic specialisations that countries have developed to maintain competitive advantages within the global maritime sector. The global shipbuilding industry has undergone a dramatic shift in the past decade, with China emerging as the undisputed leader in market share, surpassing traditional powerhouses such as South Korea and Japan. While existing scholarship attributes China’s dominance to state-backed financial subsidies, strategic industrial policies, and economies of scale fewer studies critically examine the sustainability of this growth amid evolving geopolitical and technological challenges. Recent analyses have focused on China’s subsidy-driven pricing advantages or its capacity to undercut competitors through cost efficiency. However, these studies overlook two critical gaps: (1) the interplay between geopolitical risks and China’s shipbuilding resilience, and (2) the industry’s preparedness to meet decarbonisation demands and advanced technological standards. Geopolitical tensions, particularly U.S.-China strategic competition, have intensified scrutiny of China’s maritime ambitions, with nations like Japan and South Korea framing Chinese dominance as a security threat. Concurrently, the International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) 2030 emissions targets have accelerated demand for green vessels, such as LNG-powered and ammonia-fuelled ships, areas where Chinese firms lag behind South Korean and European innovators. While prior research acknowledges these challenges, it does not systematically evaluate how China’s state-capitalist model—combining subsidies, R&D investments, and policy flexibility—could mitigate these risks. This article addresses these gaps by interrogating the adaptive capacity of China’s shipbuilding industry. It argues that despite mounting geopolitical headwinds and technological deficits, China’s centralised governance structure enables rapid reallocation of resources to sustain dominance. For instance, recent state directives prioritise dual-use technologies (e.g., autonomous vessels) and green shipping subsidies, suggesting a strategic pivot overlooked in current literature. By synthesising policy analysis, trade data, and case studies, this study contributes a nuanced framework for understanding how state support shapes industrial resilience in an era of multipolar competition and climate-driven disruption.
China’s Shipbuilding Industry
China’s shipbuilding industry has witnessed remarkable growth since the early 2000s, culminating in its emergence as the world’s largest shipbuilding nation by 2010. In 2023, China accounted for 46% of the world’s completed tonnage and 63.5% of new orders. The year 2024 saw a 52% increase in the output to 87.11 million DWT according to statistics from the China Association of the National Shipbuilding Industry (CANSI). As of 2025, global shipbuilding orders are concentrated in China, the Republic of Korea and Japan. These three economies accounted for 96% of shipbuilding in terms of gross tonnage with China alone responsible for 53%. China has been a big driver of seaborne activity in the last 20 years and is already the third-largest merchant fleet in the world.
10.5281/zenodo.17108602