Principals' Attitudes Toward Emergency Action Plan Implementation And Crisis Mitigation Readiness In Secondary Schools: A Qualitative Study In Kilimanjaro, Tanzania

In recent years, schools worldwide have faced a rising tide of crises, fires, floods, violence, and medical emergencies. Africa is no exception. In Tanzania, news reports of school fires destroying dormitories, students collapsing from heatstroke, and outbreaks of violence have become disturbingly routine. Yet, when a crisis strikes, the difference between chaos and coordinated response almost always comes down to one thing: whether a school has a working Emergency Action Plan (EAP). An EAP is not a dusty document. It is a practical framework that answers three simple questions: Who does what? When do they do it? And how? Despite the obvious need, school leadership, specifically principals, has been the most overlooked piece of crisis preparedness. Principals are the gatekeepers. Their attitudes determine whether an EAP gets written, practiced, revised, or ignored. If a principal believes crises are unlikely or that safety is someone else's job, the entire school remains exposed. In Tanzania, the problem is not a lack of national guidelines. The problem is weak, inconsistent implementation at the school level. Policies exist on paper, but they rarely become daily practice.

Here is the research gap that this study addresses: Existing studies have counted how many schools have plans, but numbers do not explain why principals act or fail to act. Quantitative surveys tell us “what” what percentage of schools have an EAP, what percentage run drills. They do not tell us “why”. They do not reveal the beliefs, justifications, and attitudes that reside in principals' minds. In Kilimanjaro, a region with good educational infrastructure yet recurring school emergencies, this gap is particularly striking. No published qualitative study has asked Tanzanian principals, in their own words, to explain how their attitudes shape EAP implementation and crisis readiness. This study does exactly that. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to understand, through principals' own accounts, how their attitudes influence EAP implementation and overall crisis-mitigation readiness. This study is guided by the following research questions:

1. How do secondary school principals in the Kilimanjaro Region understand Emergency Action Plans?

2. What attitudes do these principals hold toward implementing EAPs?

3. How do those attitudes influence actual crisis-mitigation readiness in their schools?

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL POSITIONING

1. Emergency Action Plans in Schools

An Emergency Action Plan (EAP) is a formal, structured, and context-specific document that outlines procedures for immediate and coordinated responses to crises within the school environment. These crises may include fires, disease outbreaks, natural disasters, violence, or medical emergencies. A comprehensive EAP typically contains evacuation routes, early warning systems, communication protocols, clearly defined staff roles, and linkages with external emergency responders such as health facilities, fire services, and security agencies. Globally, institutions such as the World Health Organization emphasize that schools are critical settings for emergency preparedness because of their responsibility for large, vulnerable populations. WHO (2020) highlights that school-based emergency planning significantly reduces mortality and injury during crises by ensuring rapid and coordinated responses. Similarly, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies advocates for school safety frameworks that integrate risk assessment, preparedness planning, and community involvement, noting that preparedness education must be continuous rather than episodic. The International Committee of the Red Cross further underscores the importance of preparedness in contexts affected by instability, arguing that institutions like schools must adopt anticipatory measures to protect life and dignity during emergencies (ICRC, 2018). Despite these global standards, in many African countries including Tanzania EAPs remain inconsistently developed and poorly institutionalized due to resource constraints, limited policy enforcement, and competing educational priorities. The importance of EAPs lies in their immediacy: emergencies do not allow time for improvisation. As humanitarian guidelines consistently stress, preparedness is the difference between chaos and coordinated response. A well-designed and practiced EAP transforms uncertainty into structured action, thereby safeguarding both students and staff.

2. Crisis-Mitigation Readiness

Crisis-mitigation readiness extends beyond the mere existence of an emergency plan; it reflects the extent to which a school is practically capable of implementing that plan effectively under real conditions. It encompasses three interrelated dimensions: preparedness, coordination, and response capacity. Preparedness includes regular training, simulation drills, the availability of emergency equipment (such as first-aid kits and fire extinguishers), and staff and student awareness. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies stresses that drills and simulations are essential for embedding procedural knowledge and reducing panic during actual crises (IFRC, 2019). Coordination refers to the clarity of roles and communication channels within the school and with external agencies. Effective coordination ensures that responsibilities are not duplicated or neglected during emergencies. Response capacity, on the other hand, is behavioral and psychological. It includes staff confidence, decision-making speed, and the ability to act under pressure. According to the World Health Organization, human factors—such as confidence, training, and prior experience are critical determinants of effective emergency response (WHO, 2021). Thus, a school may possess a well-written EAP but still lack readiness if stakeholders are unfamiliar with its content or have never practiced its implementation. Readiness, therefore, is not bureaucratic but operational; it is demonstrated through action rather than documentation.

3. Principals’ Attitudes and Policy Implementation

Principals play a pivotal role as policy actors in translating written frameworks into lived practices within schools. Their attitudes toward Emergency Action Plans significantly influence whether such plans are adopted, resourced, and sustained. Attitudes are inherently value-laden and shape decision-making priorities. A principal who perceives EAPs as peripheral or unnecessary is unlikely to allocate time, funding, or attention to their development and implementation. Conversely, a principal who views emergency preparedness as a moral and professional obligation will actively promote training, organize drills, and seek partnerships with external agencies even in resource-constrained environments. This perspective aligns with the ethical framework advanced by Aidan G. Msafiri, who emphasizes the concept of moral responsibility and leadership accountability in African institutional contexts. Msafiri argues that leadership decisions are deeply rooted in ethical commitments to human dignity, social responsibility, and the protection of life (Msafiri, 2008). Applied to school settings, this suggests that principals’ ethical orientations directly shape their commitment to student safety and crisis preparedness. Empirical research in educational policy further supports the argument that frontline leaders’ beliefs are among the strongest predictors of policy implementation outcomes. In the context of crisis management, this relationship is even more pronounced, as emergencies demand rapid, instinctive responses guided not only by written policies but also by deeply internalized values and attitudes.

4. Theoretical Lens: Theory of Planned Behaviour

This study is anchored in Icek Ajzen's Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB), which provides a robust framework for understanding how individual beliefs influence behaviour. TPB posits that human action is guided by three categories of beliefs: behavioural beliefs (which shape attitudes), normative beliefs (which shape perceived social pressure), and control beliefs (which shape perceived behavioural control). These beliefs collectively influence an individual’s intention to perform a behavior, which in turn determines actual behavior. In the context of this study, a principal’s positive or negative attitude toward EAPs (behavioral belief), perceived expectations from educational authorities or peers (normative belief), and perceived capacity to implement EAPs (control belief) interact to form an intention to adopt and implement emergency preparedness measures. For example, a principal who believes that EAPs are effective (attitude), perceives that other school leaders and authorities prioritize them (norm), and feels capable of organizing drills despite limited resources (control) is more likely to implement EAPs successfully. This implementation then enhances crisis-mitigation readiness within the school.

TPB thus establishes a clear causal pathway
Attitudes → Intentions → Implementation → Readiness.

By applying TPB, this study seeks to examine whether this behavioral chain holds in low-resource Tanzanian school contexts, where structural constraints may interact with individual beliefs to influence policy outcomes.

5. Identified Research Gap

Here is exactly what is missing. First, existing studies are overwhelmingly quantitative. They use surveys and checklists to count EAPs, but they cannot explain the psychological mechanisms behind principals' actions. Second, no study has applied the Theory of Planned Behavior to school crisis leadership in Tanzania. Third, there is a complete absence of qualitative research that lets Tanzanian principals speak for themselves about why they implement or ignore EAPs. This study fills all three gaps by providing thick description from Kilimanjaro, grounded in TPB.

METHODOLOGY

1. Research Design

A qualitative exploratory case study design was used. This design is appropriate when the goal is to understand a phenomenon in its real-life context, particularly when the boundaries between attitudes and actions are blurred.

2. Research Context

The study was conducted in the Kilimanjaro Region of northeastern Tanzania. This region was selected because it has a relatively high density of secondary schools, varying levels of resources, and has experienced several reported school emergencies, including fires and student injuries, over the past five years.

3. Participants and Sampling

Participants were 12 secondary school principals. Purposive sampling was used to select principals from government and private schools, from rural and semi-urban settings, and from schools of different sizes. This sample size is consistent with qualitative studies aiming for thematic saturation, which was reached after the tenth interview.

4. Data Collection

Primary data were collected through semi-structured interviews lasting 45–60 minutes each. Interviews were conducted in a mix of English and Kiswahili, recorded, and transcribed verbatim. Additionally, school safety documents (where available) were reviewed to cross-check claims about existing EAPs.

5. Data Analysis

Thematic analysis followed Braun and Clarke's six-phase process. Transcripts were coded openly, then grouped into axial categories, and finally synthesized into five overarching themes. Two independent coders reviewed a subset of transcripts to ensure consistency.

6. Trustworthiness

Trustworthiness in this qualitative study was ensured through the application of four key criteria: credibility, dependability, confirmability, and transferability, as originally proposed by Yvonna S. Lincoln and Egon G. Guba (1985). Credibility refers to the confidence in the truthfulness of the findings. In this study, credibility was enhanced through member checking, in which three participants were invited to review summarized interpretations of the data to verify their accuracy and resonance with their lived experiences. This process helps to minimize researcher misinterpretation and ensures that participants' perspectives are authentically represented (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Additionally, prolonged engagement with the data and careful attention during interviews contributed to a deeper understanding of participants' viewpoints. Dependability concerns the consistency and reliability of the research process over time. To ensure dependability, a comprehensive audit trail was maintained, documenting all stages of the research process, including data collection procedures, coding frameworks, theme development, and analytical decisions. This aligns with recommendations by Michael Quinn Patton (2015), who emphasizes transparency in qualitative inquiry as a means of enabling external scrutiny and replication of the research logic. Confirmability addresses the extent to which the findings are shaped by the participants rather than researcher bias or subjective interpretation. In this study, confirmability was strengthened through the use of reflexivity memos written immediately after each interview. These memos captured the researcher’s reflections, assumptions, and potential biases, thereby promoting self-awareness and analytical neutrality. As noted by John W. Creswell and Cheryl N. Poth (2018), reflexivity is essential for enhancing the objectivity and integrity of qualitative findings. Transferability refers to the extent to which the findings can be applied to other contexts. While the results of this study are context-specific and not intended for broad generalization, transferability was supported through the provision of thick description detailed accounts of the research setting, participants, and processes. This allows readers to determine the applicability of the findings to similar educational environments. According to Lincoln and Guba (1985), such contextual richness is critical for enabling informed judgments about the relevance of qualitative results in other settings.

7. Ethical Considerations

Ethical approval was obtained from a local research committee. All principals gave written informed consent. Anonymity was guaranteed: school names and principal identifiers were removed. Participants were told they could withdraw at any time without consequence.

FINDINGS

Theme 1: Understanding of Emergency Action Plans Narrow and Often Wrong

Most principals had a shallow, sometimes dangerously incomplete understanding of EAPs. They almost always equated an EAP with a fire evacuation diagram. Few mentioned medical emergencies, violent incidents, or natural disasters. One principal's words reveal the gap: "I know the fire route. We have it near the staff room. But for other things like if a student has a seizure? No, we don't have a written plan for that. I didn't know we were supposed to." (Principal 4, government school)

Another principal openly admitted confusion: "I thought an emergency plan was just the school rules. You know, 'don't run in the corridors.' But a real crisis? A student bleeding? I don't have a plan for that." (Principal 7, rural school)

This misunderstanding is not trivial. Principals believed they were prepared when they were not. The gap between perceived and actual readiness is itself a risk factor.

Theme 2: Principals' Attitudes Toward EAPs: A Clear Divide

Attitudes are split into two distinct groups. The first group (5 principals) held positive attitudes toward EAPs, viewing them as a core responsibility. One said: "I sleep better knowing my teachers have practiced what to do. A plan is not extra work. It is the work. If I don't do this, who will?" (Principal 8, private school)

Another added: "When the water tank broke and flooded the latrines, we followed our plan. Within an hour, students were safe. That is because I insisted we prepare. It paid off." (Principal 10)

The second group (7 principals) held negative or indifferent attitudes. They saw EAPs as bureaucratic theater. One said bluntly, "That book sits in the drawer. We have real problems no desks, no lab equipment, no clean water. A drill does not teach mathematics. Ask the parents if they want a fire drill or exam results. You know the answer."

(Principal 2, rural government school)

Another principal expressed fatigue with what he called "paper policies": "Every year, the district sends a new requirement. Last year it was gender clubs. This year it is emergency plans. Next year something else. Nothing sticks. So why should I break my back for this one?" (Principal 5)

Theme 3: Implementation Practices Plans Exist, Action Does Not

Only three of the twelve schools had conducted a full emergency drill in the past year. Most principals admitted their EAP was either absent or outdated. Even among those with positive attitudes, implementation was inconsistent. One principal explained the gap between intention and action: "Last year, I wanted a fire drill. I really did. But the teachers said the students would panic and parents would complain. So I dropped it. My intention was there. My follow-through was not." (Principal 6, semi-urban school)

Document reviews confirmed that four schools had no written EAP at all. Among the eight that did, none had been revised within two years. One principal kept his EAP in a locked drawer: "It is there. See? The binder. But I haven't opened it since the day the district officer came. That was 2019." (Principal 11)

Theme 4: Influence on Crisis Readiness Attitude Predicts Action

A direct, observable relationship emerged between principals' attitudes and readiness. Schools whose principals expressed positive attitudes had conducted at least one drill, had assigned clear roles, and could describe a recent response. One principal explained the cause-and-effect: "You cannot separate my attitude from my school's readiness. I believe in preparation. So I make time for it. Last term, we practiced evacuation twice. My teachers complained, but I told them: 'When the fire comes, complaining will not save you.'"  (Principal 9)

In contrast, schools with negative-attitude principals showed no coordinated response capability. One principal's honesty was chilling: "If a fire started now, honestly? I would just shout 'run.' There is no other plan. No whistle. No assembly point. Nothing. And that scares me, but I don't know how to fix it alone." (Principal 1)

Another admitted: "We have never practiced anything. Not once. If a student stopped breathing, I would call the nearest clinic. But while waiting? I would just stand there. I don't know CPR. Nobody does." (Principal 3)

Theme 5: Barriers to Implementation: Three Concrete Walls

Principals consistently named three barriers. First, resources: no budget for first-aid kits, alarms, or signage. Second, training gaps: most had never received any crisis leadership training. Third, policy enforcement: the Ministry requires EAPs but never checks. One principal summarized the third barrier powerfully: "No one from the district has ever asked to see our emergency plan. Not once in eight years. So why would I prioritize it? You inspect what you expect. They inspect nothing." (Principal 12)

Another added: "I would need training. Real training. Not a pamphlet. Show me what to do. Practice with me. Then I will practice with my teachers. But no one has ever offered that." (Principal 4)

DISCUSSION

The findings are not merely descriptive. They reveal a clear pattern that directly tests the Theory of Planned Behavior. Let us walk through each TPB component.

Attitudes. Theme 2 showed a split: positive and negative attitudes. According to TPB, positive attitudes should produce stronger intentions to implement EAPs. This held true. Principals who said, "a plan is the work" (Principal 8) also reported trying to implement. However, and this is critical, positive attitudes alone did not guarantee success. Principal 6 wanted a fire drill but dropped it due to teacher resistance and fear of parent complaints. This introduces the second TPB component.

Subjective norms. Principal 6's failure occurred because he perceived that teachers and parents would disapprove. That is a normative belief. TPB predicts that perceived social pressure can override positive attitudes. The data confirm this. Even principals who personally valued EAPs backed down when they believed their community would judge them negatively.

Perceived behavioral control: This is where the theory meets hard reality. Principals consistently reported low perceived control over the resources, training, and enforcement needed to implement EAPs. Principal 1 said he would "just shout 'run'" because he did not know how to fix the problem on his own. Principal 4 said, "No one has ever offered training. Principal 12 said, "No one from the district has ever asked." These are control beliefs. When principals believe they lack the means, the skills, and the support, their perceived behavioral control collapses and with it, their intention to act.

The chain: TPB says: Attitudes + Norms + Control → Intention → Behavior. In this study, the chain broke in two places. First, for principals with negative attitudes, intention never formed. Second, for principals with positive attitudes but low perceived control, intention formed but did not translate into behavior. Principal 6 intended to run a drill but did not. This extends TPB by showing that in low-resource settings, perceived behavioral control is not just a moderating factor it is often the deciding factor. Without it, good attitudes die on the vine.

Comparison with previous studies: Earlier quantitative studies in Kenya and South Africa found a correlation between principal training and EAP implementation. But they could not explain “why” training mattered. This study provides the mechanism: training raises perceived behavioral control. When Principal 4 says "show me what to do," he is asking for the confidence that comes from mastery. That confidence is precisely perceived behavioral control. Without it, principals feel helpless even when they care.

New contribution from Kilimanjaro: The most striking finding is the complete absence of accountability. Principal 12's statement "no one from the district has ever asked in eight years" reveals a systemic failure. In TPB terms, subjective norms are shaped by what important others (like district officers) actually do. When district officers never inspect, they send a powerful signal: this is not important. That signal overrides any written policy. This study contributes a new insight: in the absence of enforcement, policy is not just weak it is effectively invisible.

POLICY, PRACTICE, AND RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS

1. Policy (Ministry of Education)

Policy effectiveness in school emergency preparedness depends not only on the existence of guidelines but on enforcement and usability at the institutional level. To strengthen implementation, the Ministry of Education should introduce biannual, unannounced spot checks conducted by district officers. These visits should focus on three critical indicators: the presence of an Emergency Action Plan (EAP), evidence of recent emergency drills, and the availability of basic emergency resources such as first-aid kits. Schools that repeatedly fail to meet these requirements should face accreditation consequences, in line with the accountability principles outlined by Michael Lipsky (1980), who emphasizes the importance of monitoring mechanisms to ensure policy compliance at the frontline level.

In addition, EAP implementation should be explicitly linked to school accreditation and funding eligibility. By tying compliance to tangible institutional benefits, principals are more likely to prioritize emergency preparedness. This approach directly strengthens perceived behavioral control, a key determinant of action in the Theory of Planned Behavior (Ickes, 1991). When school leaders recognize both the expectations and consequences associated with implementation, their likelihood of acting increases significantly.

Furthermore, the Ministry should provide a simplified, one-page EAP template specifically designed for low-resource school environments. This template should include essential elements such as evacuation routes, assembly points, staff roles, and emergency contact information. Simplifying the planning process reduces administrative burden and removes barriers associated with overly complex documentation. This recommendation aligns with guidance from the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (2019), which emphasizes the importance of accessible and context-appropriate tools in enhancing disaster preparedness at the community level.

2. Practice (Principal Training)

At the practice level, principal training programs must shift from theory-based instruction to experiential, action-oriented learning. One critical improvement is the inclusion of live simulation exercises such as mock fire outbreaks or medical emergencies in all training sessions. These simulations provide principals with hands-on experience in executing emergency procedures, thereby strengthening both competence and confidence. According to David A. Kolb (1984), experiential learning enhances knowledge retention and skill development by allowing individuals to learn through direct experience.

In addition, training programs should incorporate sessions on low-cost crisis preparedness strategies. These may include practical techniques such as using whistle systems for alerts, marking evacuation routes with locally available materials, and conducting rapid teacher briefings. Such approaches are particularly relevant in resource-constrained settings and are consistent with scalable preparedness strategies promoted by the World Health Organization (2021).

Finally, principals should be required to conduct at least one emergency drill within 30 days of completing their training and submit a brief reflective report. This requirement is intended not as a punitive measure but as a mechanism to encourage immediate application of learned skills. Evidence from implementation research suggests that early practice reinforces behavioral change and supports the development of sustainable habits, ultimately improving crisis-mitigation readiness in schools.

3. Research

Future studies should expand to regions such as Dar es Salaam, Mbeya, and Mtwara to examine contextual variation. A mixed-methods approach could quantify how perceived behavioural control translates into implementation, testing relationships proposed by Icek Ajzen (1991). Intervention-based studies are also needed to evaluate the impact of training and policy reforms.

LIMITATIONS

This study has three limitations. First, findings are context-specific to Kilimanjaro, limiting transferability, though supported by thick description (Yvonna S. Lincoln & Egon G. Guba, 1985). Second, the sample size (n = 12), while sufficient for qualitative saturation, limits statistical generalization. Third, reliance on self-reported data introduces potential bias. Future research should incorporate direct observations of drills to validate reported practices.

CONCLUSION

This study set out to answer three questions. First, how do principals understand EAPs? Narrowly and often incorrectly mostly as fire plans. Second, what attitudes do they hold? A clear split: some see EAPs as essential, others as irrelevant. Third, how do attitudes influence readiness? Directly. Positive attitudes produce higher readiness, but only when principals also have training, resources, and a sense that someone will check. Without those, good intentions collapse.

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